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nature of departures from the previous research are substantial. The markets studied here were much larger, so parameters took values in a more continuous manner. The experiments studied here involved two markets, so entry into the falling average cost market was accompanied by the opportunity cost of profits foregone in the alternative market. The alternative market was a computerized double auction which agents generally enjoy, so entry into the falling average cost market did not result from an attempt to relieve boredom, which one might have suspected played a role in previous studies. Agents entering the falling average cost market were required to make a choice of scale of plant that affected costs. Thus, the theory of cost minimization played an active role in developing models. This dimension was completely absent from previous experiments. Previous experiments used linear average costs that fell with volume until a capacity constraint was reached (within the range of demand) and then costs became vertical. Average costs in the experiments reported here were nonlinear and fell throughout the range of demand. In addition, the nonlinearities, scale economies, and demand were configured to create Cournot equilibria in the appropriate Cournot model of the environment. The Cournot equilibria were separated from the competitive (price equals average cost plus opportunity cost) equilibrium. In previous experiments the Cournot equilibrium was also the competitive equilibrium. The number of potential entrants used in previous experiments was small, ranging from two to four. In the experiments reported here, there were seven potential competitors. Briefly put, the choice of parameters for the experiments reported here was such that the economic environment was similar to those commonly found in the figures in economics textbooks.
II. Experimental Environment, Design and Procedures
A total of three experiments were conducted. Subjects were students at the California Institute of Technology and summer interns at Caltech. Some of the subjects were experienced in the operation of electronic markets. As it turns out, the empirical tendencies that were observed in the experiments are so pronounced that only three experiments appear to be needed to answer the original question posed. Since the experiments are expensive in terms of time and money, a decision was made to limit the number of experiments to three. Given the behavior exhibited by the twenty-one people studied, the expectation that anything would be learned from additional replications seems too low to justify the cost.
Each experiment consisted of 7 buyers and 7 sellers. Subjects with experience were placed in the more complex role of sellers. Two markets were created. They will be called market A and market B. The buyers could participate in both. Sellers could participate in either but not in both. In market A sellers had identical cost functions designed such that they were guaranteed a rent from participating in the market. The parameters were chosen such that in market A the rents per seller and the market price were (theoretically) independent of the number of sellers that chose to sell in that market. Market A was organized by a (computerized) double auction that fully occupied the attention of the sellers that chose to function in that market so they would not be motivated by boredom to enter market B.
Market B was different. Sellers that chose to operate in market B made irrevocable decisions about scale of plant, the quantity that they would offer for sale and the price they would post. Thus, the market organization was the standard posted price environment in which commitments were private information until the market opened. The only difference was that a seller could choose to drop out of the market once the decisions of other sellers were public but before the market opened. The decisions to drop out were also private (revealed simultaneously) and irrevocable. The dropout decision served to limit losses to the opportunity cost of market A profits foregone, and reduced the probability that subject bankruptcies would disrupt the experiment. In market B all sellers had the same cost function. The cost function was characterized by economies of scale. In summary, the economic environment had the following properties:
1. Participation in market B involved an opportunity cost because reasonably predictable rents could be gained from participation in market A. 2. Participation in market A was "fun" in the sense that many people enjoy the speed and activity of the computerized double auction. 3. Participation in market B could be done without exposure to a major out-of-pocket loss.
Sellers could "drop out" if they expected volume to be less than was anticipated at the time that scale of plant was chosen. 
Individual parameters for the demanders are in Table I . Each of seven demanders made money by participating in market A and in market B. Each buyer had the same redemption values 
The optimum scale of plant given a quantity x is indicated by s*(x). The formula is s*x) = 10 + 3/4x.
Substituting (3) into (2), the long-run average cost function, LRAC (x) is obtained.
LRAC(x) = SRAC(x,s*(x)) = 600-15x + 3/16x2.
Of course this yields the long-run total cost (LRTC) and the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) as follows:
LRMC(x) = dLRTC(x)/dx = 600 -30x + 9/16x2.
The continuous model will be very useful to the interested reader. The complicated calculations for the equilibria of various models were first done in the context of the continuous model. The location of the equilibria in models based on discrete parameters was always nearby.
Market Organization
Market A was a computerized double auction. Market B was a posted price market. Both markets opened at the same time for trading. Sellers were informed about the market demand function in market B but they knew nothing about the market demand function in market A. Since market A followed standard procedures for MUDA markets,2 only the timing and the details of market B need to be reviewed.
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Procedures
The experiments were conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science at Caltech. Subjects consisted of undergraduates, graduate students at the California Institute of Technology, plus high school students who were attending a special summer program. Most had previous experience in some type of computerized market. All had paged through a computerized instruction routine that familiarized them with key functions and the mechanics of making bids, offers, and acceptances.
In addition to the three experiments reported here, pilot experiments were conducted. The pilot experiments were discarded because they typically involved choices of parameters that were based on a miscalculation of the theoretical models. The parameters and procedures of one experiment were exactly like those reported in this paper but the data are not reported because one subject evidenced substantial confusion. The results of these unreported experiments appeared qualitatively similar to the experiments that are reported here. Space constraints effectively preclude their publication. Should anyone want to study them in detail, the data will be made available upon request. Experimental sessions which lasted on the order of three hours began in the evening at about 7:00 P.M. The detailed instructions that were read to the subjects are contained in Plott, Sugiyama, and Elbaz [8]. In addition, the material presented on the chalkboard and the step-bystep procedures for conducting the experiment are also included.
The highlights of these experimental procedures are as follows. Subjects were paid a "show up" fee of $5.00 if they were extras and were turned away from participation. Subjects agreed to work off any losses incurred during the experiment at a rate of $10.00 per hour. Of course, buyers could make no losses unless they resulted from some sort of (foolish) speculation or from a typo. Contracts involving obvious typos that would result in large losses were always voided by the experimenter (a standard practice). However, sellers could make a loss. Two practice periods were conducted. The parameters were the same as those that were used in the experiment. The mechanics of the experiment were very complex and many questions were prompted during these sessions. The answers to all questions were given publicly in a form that yielded no information about parameters that was not already public. After each period, for the first five periods (including the two practice periods), the accounting of each subject was checked and spot checks were made throughout the experiment.
III. Models
Ten different types of models can be applied to the economic environment. Of course these models share many basic principles but they also differ in many ways. Some give sharp predictions and the others remain vague. Where possible the models will be applied directly to the environment in a technical, mathematical fashion. Speculations and theorizing about which model might be expected to fit the data best are not considered to be part of the exercise at this stage of the experimental inquiry. Table III contains a summary of the predictions for those models for which predictions can be computed. The paragraphs below will briefly describe each model listed in the table. A note on efficiency may be useful, especially for those who are not familiar with experimental economics. The measure invented by Plott and Smith [7, 133-53] is a direct adaptation of consumers' and producers' surpluses. The buyers receive franc redemption values from the experimenter that can be modeled as a (derived) demand function. The total value of francs redeemed by buyers is like the gross benefits to buyers from the units they acquired. Sellers pay francs to the experimenter for units sold. These payments are costs. The allocation that maximizes gross benefits minus costs is the most efficient. It is the one that maximizes franc earnings of subjects (exhausts all possible gains from exchange). Actual franc earnings divided by the maximum possible is the efficiency with which the system is operating.
Under ordinary modes of organization, 100 percent efficiency of operation is thought to be unattainable in the downward sloping average cost case. If a single price is charged, and if price is equated to marginal cost, then sellers would lose money. This degree of inefficiency is thought to be structural in the falling-average cost case.
Other practical sources of inefficiency exist. Tough bargaining sometimes results in failures to trade. Suppliers might choose the "wrong" scale of plant and thereby impose more costs on the system than necessary. Suppliers might choose to enter the B market and then cancel. The efficiency loss would be due to the opportunity cost of the low cost units that such suppliers could have delivered to the A market. Suppliers might choose an unnecessarily limiting quantity of x offer to the market B. In the section on models the efficiency of the equilibria allocation predicted Table IV. Tacit Collusion Collusion models are very numerous depending upon the complexity of the agreement that can be enforced. It is assumed here that collusion would lead to choices of variables that are good from the seller's point of view. We presume that the values would be something between Cournot and monopoly and that the volume would be similarly restricted. Application of the class of models to any real market, especially the ones created for these experiments, might be met with three a priori criticisms/qualifications. First, the Cournot solutions to the technical problems are generally not unique. Typically, both symmetric solutions in which all firms act identically and asymmetric solutions, in which some firms are larger than others, exist. The symmetric solutions and those asymmetric solutions that have been identified and seem plausible have been included in Table III . The second qualification is that the principles that might govern entry into a market are not systematically integrated (unless lack of entry is treated as part of an asymmetric solution) into the analysis. For this reason, a special treatment of Cournot models, under a heading called monopolistic competition, is included. The third criticism is derived from the nature of the market structure itself. Agents in these markets post a price and a quantity. There is every reason to assume that the seller with the lowest price will sell all units that the seller offers, up to the demand function limits. The hypothesis that the quantity sold by other sellers remains constant, will almost certainly be violated. Thus, the structure of the decision problem might appear to resemble that of the Bertrand theory, more than Cournot, depending upon how the posted quantity is treated in the analysis. Without side payments, such as a subsidy to compensate a firm for losses, and a completely different institutional arrangement, such as marginal cost pricing, or the incentive compatible equivalent, average cost pricing might be the best that can be expected from a consumer's point of view. It is used as a measure for 100 percent efficiency.
Over-Contested Market Equilibrium. This model postulates that the price and quantities sold would be the same as the perfectly contested outcome above. The only difference is the number of firms that have decided to enter. Previous experiments have defined this model to predict that all of the potential firms enter. Obviously, the plausibility of such phenomena would a priori seem low but this model is included as a benchmarker for completeness. The number, 5, is taken to be the maximum that could leave market A and still have it behave competitively.

Unstable ("Bertrand")
We do not know the equilibrium of the Bertrand model of these experimental markets. Presumably it involves some sort of mixed strategy. In the data this would appear as a type of variability in prices. At this point the model is included for completeness and to draw attention to the possibility that the data might not exhibit any type of monotone convergence property. It is also included to draw attention to the fact that the literature contains suggestions about how such variability phenomena might be modeled should it be observed.
Market Collapse (Type 1)
Entry into the contested market will involve a cost. The possibility of out-of-pocket losses also exists. Since there are no mechanisms for coordinating entry, sellers might all decide to operate only in the A market. Under such a circumstance the supply in B would be zero. The market would have collapsed. Type 1 collapse is the case when no firm enters the B market.
Market Collapse (Type 2)
The second type of collapse can occur when more than one firm decides to enter but all cancel leaving no one to supply the market. This is a type of coordination failure which can occur because the decisions to cancel market B offers are made simultaneously. Support. All models are static equilibrium models. However, the data for the B markets, such as the one contained in Figure 6 , exhibits an obvious type of convergence pattern which is not captured by any of the models, even if a random error term is added. In the absence of additional theory appended to the models to take care of the dynamics, the models are rejected. I The second result is perhaps the central result of the paper. It states that the contestable market theory is the one best supported by the data. In the B markets prices and volumes tended to be closer to the contestable market models than any of the others. In 41 of the 57 periods, prices were within 10 francs of the price predicted by the contestable-market models (325). In no period was the price within 10 francs of the price predicted by the natural monopoly model (684), and in no period was the price within 10 francs of the price predicted by any Coumot model (609). The count comes directly from the data in Table IV and the predictions in Table III Volume of individual firms further support the contestability model over the Courot models and the monopolistic competition models which, because of symmetry assumptions, predict that all B market entrants will have the same volume. In 53 of the 57 periods no more than one firm had positive sales in the B market. Thus, in 53 of 57 periods the data support contestability over monopolistic competition. In none of these three periods in which more than one firm made B market sales, was the distribution volumes near equality as predicted by the symmetric game models. As will be implicit in the discussions below, sellers that chose to enter the B market did not limit their quantities as required by the Coumot model and as they could have done under the procedures.
IV. Results
The
In market B profit levels predicted by competing models are in Table III . Profits should be at, or above 300, which is the (nearly) certain profit that can be obtained for participation in market A. Actual profits are in Table V Efficiency levels are reported in Table IV . The average efficiency level for the three experiments is .91, .91, and .90, which is much closer to the .94 predicted by the over-contested market model than it is the efficiency predicted by natural monopoly (80%), duopoly (76%), triopoly (70%), monopolistic competition (67%), or market collapse (41%). On average, the perfectly contested model is a better predictor of efficiency than any of the noncontested models.
In all dimensions the two contestable market theories are better predictors than the alternative models. If one is forced to choose between the perfectly-contested model and the over-contested model the choice will be the former. The average number of entrants per period is 2.56, which is closer to the one predicted by the perfectly contested model than the five predicted by the over-contested model. I
The next five observations focus on aspects of strategic behavior and on system behavior. The first four of the observations are related to individual behavior and the strategies that individuals employ. The fifth observation is a summary property of the system as a whole.
Observation 1 suggests that people bias their choices of prices in favor of those divisible by 5 and that individual strategies exhibit a degree of modification to take advantage of the underlying bias. For example, knowing about this bias, perhaps even in their own behavior, people sometimes reduce their own price by a unit. That is, rather than quote a price of 325 an individual might quote 324; or a 330 quotation would be modified downward to 329 rather than, say, increased to 331. The third observation is that scale choices of agents are optimal given actual volumes sold by sellers. This is particularly interesting because the scale choices are not optimal given the quantities offered for sale by sellers. Recall that sellers entering market B chose a scale, a price, and a quantity offered. The observation is that the scale choice suggests that sellers (correctly) expected to sell the market demand quantity but they offered a little more than that expectation in hope that the volume would be (possibly accidentally) higher. Support. Figure 8 shows deviations of actual scale chosen from the theoretical optimum scale given the price quoted by the agent. If the seller has the lowest price then the demand function can be used to determine the quantity that will be sold. The quantity to be sold can be used to determine the optimal scale for that quantity. The figure shows deviations from this optimum where 0 indicates the optimum and + 1 indicates one letter deviations from the optimum. As can be seen in the figure, the mode of choice is the optimum given the price. The same calculation can be made using the quantities offered for sale. Figure 9 shows deviation of scale choice from the optimum given the quantity offered. As can be seen, the scale choices tend to be smaller than this calculation of optimum. I The next observation is that agents specialize in markets. Some agents are always in market A while others have a propensity to enter market B. Table VIII contains The final Observation 5 concerns the behavior of the whole market system. As was noted in Result 2, efficiencies are not at 100% as they should be if both the competitive model and the perfectly contested market were working perfectly to predict behavior. On average, excluding the first periods, the system of both markets is operating at an efficiency level of about 91.3%. While this is much better than the 80% predicted by the natural monopoly model, or the 41% predicted by the market collapse model, these two models suggest sources of inefficiency that can be interpreted as the social cost of regulation. If more than one firm happens to enter the market there is an opportunity cost of profits foregone in market A. On the other hand, if there is under entry (no firm enters and sells) an efficiency loss will exist due to the loss of consumer surplus in market B. The observation is that the efficiency loss from these two sources amounts to about 67% of the 8.7% average loss in system efficiency (not including the first periods). Once the "regulatory cost" or "uncoordinated entry cost" is removed, the remaining 3.2% efficiency loss is of interest. This percentage represents the combined effects of typos, wrong scale choices, inefficiencies due to strategic maneuvering, inefficiencies due to posted prices above average cost, etc. The fact that the combined effect of all sources of inefficiency is small, strongly suggests that, with the exception of uncoordinated entry, the perfectly contested market theory is predicting almost perfectly. That is, the cost expended on this form of regulation has been almost perfect in achieving its desired effect.
V. Conclusions
This paper posed a series of questions. First, will increasing returns result in a single seller? Will the single seller charge a monopoly price? If a monopoly price is not charged, do models exist that accurately predict what the price will be? The answer to the first question is "yes." For the most part, all sales tend to be made by a single agent. This is a particularly interesting result since neither monopolistically competitive or oligopolistic structures tended to evolve, even though they could have. In particular, the data provide no support at all for Cournot models of industrial structure and pricing.
The answer to the second question is "no." Even though sales were almost always by a single seller, monopolistic pricing did not emerge. Instead, the single seller sold at prices near those that would prevail if units were supplied at the lowest average cost that covered the opportunity cost of the supplying firm. The supplying firm chose to operate at a scale of plant and at prices such that consumers paid the lowest possible price subject to the constraint that the supplier did not make a loss. Briefly put, the system behavior was closer to that described by contestable market theory than any of the other models considered.
In some respects, the data here provide strong support for the conclusions drawn from other studies that experimentally examined the possibility of contestability theory. One could have been concerned that the results of other studies might have been due to subject boredom, the linearity of costs, the lack of latitude for monopolistically competitive organizations, etc. The results of this paper demonstrate that such concern about previous results are not well-founded. The fundamental tendencies reported by others were observed after all of the potential explanations were controlled.
To the extent that contestable market theory fell short of accurate predictions, the nature of the failure of contestability theory is interesting. The tendency to enter the "monopolized" market is too great and there is a chance that no one will enter. Firms tended to enter the industry in the hope that the incumbent would try to raise prices to near monopoly levels. Given the behavior of the incumbent, these firms would have been better off participating in alternative economic activity. In a sense, the policing activity was the cost of regulating the incumbent. Aside from this monitoring cost, the system worked substantially as predicted by contestability theory.
Obviously there exist many alternative ways to conduct experiments and check the robustness of the results reported here. Existing theory, especially game theory, is rich with suggestions for further experiments, Shapiro [9, 330-414]. Theoretically, the timing of decisions could switch market behavior between Bertrand and Cournot. Theories of signaling, repeated games, and other facets of dynamic rivalry, suggest variables and circumstances that might have dramatic effects on behavior. The message, at this point, seems to be that future research and experimental designs to explore these many possibilities should proceed on the presumption that contestability theory will have considerable exploratory power.
